| 言語種別 | 英語 |
|---|---|
| 発行・発表の年月 | 2020 |
| 形態種別 | 学術研究論文 |
| 査読 | 査読あり |
| 標題 | Inefficiency in alternately repeated coordination games with dynastic preferences |
| 執筆形態 | 単著 |
| 掲載誌名 | Economics Bulletin |
| 掲載区分 | 国外 |
| 出版社・発行元 | ECONOMICS BULLETIN |
| 巻・号・頁 | 40(4),1-5 |
| 著者・共著者 | Chihiro Morooka |
| 概要 | This study investigates a specific model of alternately repeated pure coordination games with overlapping generations, where the one-shot game has multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. We consider the case in whichthe payoff of each player is affected by the outcome after his retirement as well as the outcome during his participation. Unlike the preceding results on alternately repeated coordination games where only the Pareto-efficient outcome is obtained in equilibria, we show that an inefficient equilibrium arises in our model. |
| ISSNコード | 15452921 |
| Put Code(ORCID) | 94314907 |