| 言語種別 | 英語 |
|---|---|
| 発行・発表の年月 | 2021 |
| 形態種別 | 学術研究論文 |
| 査読 | 査読あり |
| 標題 | Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games |
| 執筆形態 | 単著 |
| 掲載誌名 | International Journal of Game Theory |
| 掲載区分 | 国外 |
| 出版社・発行元 | SPRINGER HEIDELBERG |
| 著者・共著者 | Chihiro Morooka |
| 概要 | This paper studies payoffs in subgame perfect equilibria of two-player discounted overlapping generations games with perfect monitoring. Assuming that mixed strategies are observable and a public randomization device is available, it is shown that sufficiently patient players can obtain any payoffs in the interior of the smallest rectangle containing the feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs of the stage game, when we first choose the rate of discount and then choose the players’ lifespan. Unlike repeated games without overlapping generations, obtaining payoffs outside the feasible set of the stage game does not require unequal discounting. |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00182-021-00779-9 |
| ISSNコード | 00207276 |
| Put Code(ORCID) | 93979391 |